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CASENOTES

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: THE EROSION OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT UNDER THE TERRY-STANDARD, CREATING SUSPICION IN HIGH CRIME AREAS-State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d

86, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2833 (in-

terim ed. 1991).'

I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past thirty years, Ohio cases have played a prominent
role in the development of fourth amendment search and seizure law.
In 1961, the United States Supreme Court used the Ohio case of Mapp
v. Ohio' to apply the exclusionary rule to the states.2 In 1968, the Ohio
case of Terry v. Ohio helped define the authority of police to investigate suspicious activity.' Concomitantly, the United States Supreme
Court defined the rights of citizens in police encounters.'
In State v. Andrews, 5 the Ohio Supreme Court revisited Terry and
the requirements which the United States Supreme Court established
regarding when an officer can seize and search an individual on the
street." The Ohio court concluded that when a police officer observes a
person running through a high crime area at night, that person may
reasonably be suspected of criminal activity and, therefore, may be
stopped and frisked by the officer. As a result of the Andrews decision,
there is a drastic reduction both in the necessary factors for an officer
to justify an investigatory stop and search, and in the fourth amendment's protections which are offered to the public.
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. Id. The exclusionary rule requires that any evidence obtained by police or prosecutors in
violation of a constitutionally protected right is inadmissable against the defendant in a criminal
proceeding. Id.
3. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
4.

Id.

5. 57 Ohio St. 3d 86, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2833 (interim ed.
1991).
6. Id. at 87, 565 N.E.2d at 1272. See infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text for a discussion on Terry and its requirements.
7.

Id.
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This article looks first at the individual factors upon which the
Ohio Supreme Court relied in justifying an investigatory stop, and
whether the court was correct in using these factors to justify a seizure
of an individual." The article then-addresses whether the factors, taken
together, attained the level of suspicion required by Terry to justify the
stop. Next, the article examines the separate justification required for
the search of the stopped suspect. The article concludes that the Ohio
Supreme Court's misapplication of the Terry analysis significantly
reduces the protections available to citizens by the fourth amendment.
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

On October 18, 1988, at 8:35 p.m., Officer Raymond Martin and
his partner were on patrol in the 3800 block of Roland Circle in Dayton, Ohio.9 The two officers were in separate cruisers and were not responding to any calls, nor were they aware of any criminal activity in
the area at the time.' 0 Martin was a twelve and one-half year veteran
of the Dayton Police Department, but had worked in the Roland Circle
area less than two months. 1 He knew, both from responding to calls in
the area' 2 and from the police department activity reports, that the
area had a high rate of drug activity, violence and weapons-related
crime.'" While his partner was questioning an individual, Officer Martin left his cruiser and began walking toward a large grassy courtyard
between apartment buildings.' 4 Before entering the courtyard, Officer
Martin noticed another police cruiser driving down Roland Circle."
After entering the dimly lit courtyard,' 6 Officer Martin saw the figure
of a black male running between the buildings of the apartment com7
plex, away from Roland Circle and in Officer Martin's direction.'

8. An investigatory stop of an individual is a type of seizure implicating the fourth amendment. See generally infra notes 59-73 and accompanying text. Likewise, a frisk is a type of search
under the fourth amendment. See generally infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
9. State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d 86, 86, 565 N.E.2d 1271, 1272 (1991), cert. denied,
III S. Ct. 2833 (interim ed. 1991).
10. State v. Andrews, No. 11477, at *3 (Montgomery County Ct. App., Nov. 16, 1989)
(LEXIS, Ohio library, App file).
11. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 86, 565 N.E.2d at 1272.
12. Transcript of Motion to Suppress at 5, State v. Andrews, No. 88-CR-2951 (Montgomery County C.P. Ct., Jan. 18, 1989).
13. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 86, 565 N.E.2d at 1272.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Officer Martin testified that it was "extremely dark" in the courtyard area. Id.
17. Id. The race of the suspect was not mentioned in either the appellate court's or the Ohio
Supreme Court's decisions but was brought up at the motion to suppress proceeding. Motion,
supra note 12, at 9, 18. On the use of race as a factor to support reasonable suspicion, see generally 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, at 451-52

(2d ed. 1987).
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When the man was about ten feet away, Officer Martin shined his
flashlight on him.1 8 The man threw down a beer can he was carrying in
his right hand and stopped running." Officer Martin told the man to
put his hands behind his head, drew his gun on the unidentified man,
and grabbed him by the chest.2 0 Martin told the man to keep his hands
up and, began to frisk him.2" Martin felt a hard object in the man's
right rear pocket, which the officer discovered to be a handgun.2 2 Martin arrested the man, Christopher Andrews, for carrying a concealed
weapon 23
At the motion to suppress the gun, Officer Martin testified that he
found Andrews' conduct suspicious. 4 When Martin saw the police car
in the vicinity and saw the man running, he believed that "possibly"
the man was running from the police.2 6 Martin, however, had received
no reports on his shoulder radio about the running man.2 Officer Martin conceded on cross-examination that he had no information that the
man was running from police, and that, for all he knew, the man could
have been out jogging.27 Officer Martin testified that for his own safety,
he searched Andrews even though he had no view of Andrews' rear
pants pockets which would have indicated to Martin that Andrews was
armed. 8
The Montgomery County Grand Jury indicted Andrews for carrying a concealed weapon.29 The trial court rejected Andrews' motion to
suppress the handgun in which he contended that the gun was obtained
through an illegal search in violation of the fourth and fourteenth
amendments.3 0 Andrews then entered a plea of no contest and appealed
the conviction to the Montgomery County Court of Appeals. a" The

18. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 86, 565 N.E.2d at 1272.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
,22. Id.
23. Id.

24. Id.
25. State v. Andrews, No. 11477, at *3 (Montgomery County Ct. App., Nov. 16, 1989)
(LEXIS, Ohio library, App file).
26. Id.
27. Id. Even though Martin admitted under cross examination that he had no information
that the suspect was running from the police and the court of appeals stated, in the fact section of
its opinion, that he had no information to support his conclusion, the editor's headnotes to the
Ohio Supreme Court's opinion state conclusively, that "the suspect was running away from a
police officer .... Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 86, 565 N.E.2d at 1272.
28. State v. Andrews, No. 11477 (Montgomery County Ct. App., Nov. 16, 1989) (LEXIS,
Ohio library, App file).
29. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 86, 565 N.E.2d at i272.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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court of appeals reversed Andrews' conviction, stating that the facts
before Officer Martin at the time of the stop lacked an adequate basis
to raise the degree of "reasonable suspicion" required for a Terry-type
stop. 2
The Supreme Court of Ohio, while admitting that the case
presented "a close question of fact," as reversed the decision of the court
of appeals and said that "objective and particularized suspicion" did
exist, justifying the stop of Andrews and the limited protective
search. 4 The court, in analyzing the totality of circumstances through
the eyes of Officer Martin, relied upon five factors: (1) the area had a
high crime rate; (2) the encounter occurred at night and in the dark;
(3) Martin had twelve years of police experience; (4) Martin was away
from his police cruiser at the time of the encounter; and (5) Andrews
was running away from an area where there was a police cruiser. s5
Justice Wright filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Sweeney
concurred. 36 Justice Wright vehemently criticized the use of the "high
crime area" factor stating "[a] citizen's Fourth Amendment rights are
the same regardless of his residence, station in life or where he happens
to be when he encounters a police officer." 37 In reviewing the facts of
the case, he argued that it was impossible for Officer Martin to have
developed the level of suspicion required under the fourth
amendment.3 8
III.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Fourth Amendment

The fourth amendment serves as a protection against unreasonable
search and seizure. 9 It is a restraint upon the state and federal govern-

32. State v. Andrews, No. 11477, at *15-17 (Montgomery County Ct. App., Nov. 16, 1989)
(LEXIS, Ohio library, App file). A Terry-stop is conducted by an officer when he has reasonable
suspicion that a suspect was or is involved in criminal activity. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
-33. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 87, 565 N.E.2d at 1273.
34. Id. at 88, 565 N.E.2d at 1273-74.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 89, 565 N.E.2d at 1275.
37. Id. at 89, 565 N.E.2d at 1275 (Wright, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 90, 565 N.E.2d at 1275-76 (Wright, J., dissenting).
39. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985); see also Project, Sixteenth Annual
Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal 1985-1986,
75 Gao. L.J. 713, 721 (1987). The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/6
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ment" ° against actions which may infringe upon a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy.4 1 In a practical sense, the fourth amendment
operates as a limitation on the conduct of police in their dealings with
42

citizens .

The standard of reasonableness for a search or seizure is determined by balancing the governmental interest in effecting the search or
seizure against the individual's privacy interest.43 The general rule is
that all restraints on a person must be justified by probable cause,44
and any search or seizure conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable.4 6 There are, however, a few very narrowly drawn exceptions to
the requirement of probable cause.4 One such exception was articulated in Terry v. Ohio.47
In Terry, a police officer observed two individuals standing a few
hundred feet away from the entrance of a store in downtown Cleveland.4" Each would alternately walk down the street, pause to look in
the store's window, then walk on, repeating the procedure on the way
back to his companion.49 After roughly twelve of these trips, the men
were joined by a third individual with whom they briefly conferred. 0
The third individual left, and after ten to twelve minutes of the same
type of "reconnaissance" of the store, the two men followed in the path
of the third. 51 The officer concluded that the three men were casing the

place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNs. amend. IV.
40. The protections of the fourth amendment are applied to the state via the Due Process
Clause of the fourteenth amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
41. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 353 (1967). The courts have used a two part
test, requiring both a subjective expectation of privacy as well as an expectation which "society is
prepared to accept as reasonable." Id. at 361.
42. The exclusionary rule may be used to suppress evidence obtained by-police in violation
of the fourth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
43. Project, supra note 39, at 721. "The reasonableness of such seizures depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary
interference by law officers." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1974). A constitutionally valid search occurs when the government's interest in the search or seizure exceeds
the privacy interest of the individual. Project, supra note 39, at 721.
44. People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 52, 378 N.W.2d 451, 455 (1985).
45. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
46. Id. The prosecution has the burden of showing that the search or seizure fits into one of
the exceptions. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85, 93 (1979).
47. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
48. Id. at 5.
49. Id. at 6.
50. Id.
51. byId.
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store, and were about to commit a "stick-up" of the store.52 The officer
approached the three men, identified himself as a police officer, and
asked for their names.5 3 After receiving a mumbled reply, the officer
conducted a pat-down search of the three men and found two pistols. 4
In Terry, the United States Supreme Court stated that the police
may justify a brief seizure 'of an individual by pointing to specific articulable facts, taken together with the rational inferences drawn from
them, that create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 55 Additionally, if the officer has reason to believe that the person is armed and
dangerous, he may conduct a limited search for weapons.5 6 The Terry
investigatory stop created a limited exception to the general require57
ment of probable cause for detaining an individual against his will.
In determining whether a seizure and search are "reasonable" in
the context of a Terry investigatory stop, a court must engage in a dual
inquiry. First, a court must determine whether the officer had a "reasonable suspicion" that the individual was engaged in criminal activity
to justify the stop. Second, provided that the stop was justified, a court
must determine whether the officer had a reasonable belief that the
individual was armed and dangerous to justify the limited search of the
suspect for weapons.58
B.

The Stop

The protections of the fourth amendment are implicated anytime
an officer "seizes" a citizen.5 9 The amendment applies to any detention

52. Id.
53. Id. at 6-7.
54. Id. at 7.
55. Id. at 21.
56. Id. at 27.
57. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). The result of Terry and its progeny has been the
creation of a three-tiered system of police-citizen interaction. Id. at 499.
1. Consensual encounter: An officer may, without any preconditions, walk up and ask an individual if he is willing to talk to her. The person is at liberty to ignore the officer's inquiries and walk
away, and the officer may not attempt to restrain him. Royer, 460 U.S. at 497-98. It is not until
the person no longer feelsfree to walk away that the fourth amendment is implicated. Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979); see also.Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (interim ed. 1991).
2. Investigatory stop: Terry requires that the officer have an articulable suspicion that a person
has committed or is about to commit a crime. Royer, 460 U.S. at 499; Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S.
85, 93 (1979).
3. An arrest: Probable cause is required to justify an arrest. In this context, probable cause means
that the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person
of reasonable caution in believing that the suspect has committed, or is about to commit, an
offense. Michigan v. De Fillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979).
58. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20.
59. "An encounter between a police officer and a citizen implicates the fourth amendment
only if the officer 'seizes' the citizen." Project, supra note 39, at 742.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/6
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by an officer, no matter how brief."' In Terry, the United States Supreme Court recognized that even a brief detention is a "serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person."'" Exactly when a seizure has
occurred may, in some cases, be difficult to determine.6 2 The Court has
applied an objective standard in its analyses, stating that a "seizure"
has occurred whenever a police officer accosts an individual and "under
the totality of circumstances a reasonable person would believe he is no
longer free to leave." 6 3
Once it has been determined that a seizure has taken place, the
court will look at the facts and circumstances observed by the officer
which led to the stop, in order to determine if the stop was based upon
a reasonable suspicion.6 4 The police officer must be able to point to
"specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrants that intrusion. '"65 The standard is an objective one: did the officer have a reasonable suspicion
based on objective facts that the individual is, or is about to be, en66
gaged in some type of criminal activity?
Courts must look to the totality of circumstances with which the
officer was presented in determining if his suspicion of criminal activity
was reasonable. 67 Furthermore, based upon the totality of circum-

60. "The Fourth Amendment, of course, 'applies to all seizures of the person, including
seizures that involve only a brief detention ....
' " Brown, 443 U.S. at 50; see also United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 52, 378 N.W.2d
451, 455 (1985).
61. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17; see also People v. Aldridge, 35 Cal. 3d 473, 674 P.2d 240, 198
Cal. Rptr. 538 (1984). "The interest at stake is far from insignificant; it is the right of every
person to enjoy the use of public streets, buildings, parks and other conveniences without unwarranted interference or harassment by agents of the law." Aldridge, 35 Cal. 3d at 478, 674 P.2d at
243, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
62. E.g., Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) (officers had not seized an individual
by driving along parallel to him as he ran without ordering him to stop).
63. Id.; see also Project, supra note 39, at 742; Brown, 443 U.S.. at 50. But see California v.
HodariD., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (interim ed. 1991), in which the United States Supreme Court seems
to have narrowed this standard, and held that a seizure does not occur until either the application
of physical force or the suspect submits to a show of authority. Id. at 1551-52.
64. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (1968).
65. Id.
66. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51. The Brown Court required that the officer have a "reasonable
suspicion, based on objective facts, that the suspect is involved in criminal activity." Id. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly required that "[a]n investigatory stop must be justified by some
objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity."
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1980) (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51
(1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979); United State v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 878 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-49 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 1619 (1968)).
67. The Supreme Court, summarizing this requirement stated that, "the essence of all that
has been written is that the totality of the circumstances - the whole picture - must be taken into
account." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
Published
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68
stances, the suspicion must have been particularized. The officer must

have had a reasonable suspicion that this particular individual was associated with the criminal activity.6 9 The Court has stated that "this
demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is
central teaching of the Court's fourth amendment
predicated is the
70
jurisprudence.
The source of this information may be from either personal obser-

vation by the officer as in Terry, or from .a police informant.7 1 While
the experience and training of the police officer may be considered, the
police may not rely on good faith or inarticulable hunches to justify the
stop. 72 In determining whether a seizure based on personal observations
was justified, the focus is on the conduct of the suspect which gives rise
to reasonable suspicion.7
C.

The Frisk

Whether a protective search for weapons incident to an investigatory stop was proper must be analyzed separately from the issue of
whether it was permissible to stop the suspect.74 The United States SuThe idea that assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion contains two elements, each of which must be present before a stop is permissible. First, the
assessment must be based upon all of the circumstances. The analysis proceeds with various objective observations, information from police reports, if such are available, and consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From these
data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions - inferences and deductions
that might well elude an untrained person . . . . The process does not deal with hard
certainties but with probabilities.
Id. at 418; see, e.g., Brown, 443 U.S. at 51; Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.
68. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18. "[T]he detaining officers must have a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." Id.
69. Id. at 418. "[T]he second element contained in the idea that assessment of the whole
picture must yield a particularized suspicion is the concept that the process just described must
raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing." Id.
70. Id.; see also Brown, 443 U.S. at 51, Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.
71. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972); Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412
(interim ed. 1990).
72. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); Brown, 443 U.S. at 52.
73. "An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person
stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
417 (1980) (emphasis added); see also Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980). The Court
stated:
Of the evidence relied on, only the fact that the petitioner preceded another person and
occasionally looked backward at him as they proceeded through the concourse relates to
their particular conduct. The other circumstances describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures were the Court
to conclude that as little foundation as there was in this case could justify a seizure.
Reid, 448 U.S. at 441 (emphasis added).
74. Not every detention of an individual will call for a frisk. W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at
505. The protective search permissible under Terry, is limited to a "pat down" of the individual's
clothing to find concealed weapons. Terry, 392 U.S. at 26.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/6
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preme Court has stated that, "nothing in Terry can be understood to
allow a generalized cursory search for weapons or, indeed, any search
The narrow scope of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk
for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the
person to be frisked ....
In order to conduct the limited protective search for a concealed
weapon, the officer must be justified in believing "that the individual
whose suspicious behavior [the officer] is investigating at close range is
armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others . . . . 7 The
purpose of the search is to allow the officer to continue his investigation
without fear of violence.77
The standard for the limited protective search requires two things:
first, that the initial stop of the suspect be justified, and second, that
the officer believe that the suspect is armed and presently represents a
danger either to the officer or to others.7 8 Once again, the court must
apply an objective standard: whether, under the circumstances, a reasonably prudent man would be warranted in believing his safety or the
safety of others was in danger. 79 This belief must be based on specific
reasonable inferences, not unparticularized and inchoate hunches. 80
The officer must be able to point to particular facts from which he
reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and presently
dangerous. 81

75. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979). In Ybarra, the Court said no frisk was
permitted, even where the "person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics
search is taking place." Id.
76. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24
(1968)); see also State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St. 3d 177, 180, 524 N.E.2d 489, 492 (1988).
77. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.
78. "So long as the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop, and has reason to believe that
the suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to this
protective purpose." Adams, 407 U.S. at 146 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30).
79. "The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is
whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his
safety or that of others was in danger." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
80. "[D]ue weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in
light of his experience." Id.
81. "In the case of a self-protective search for weapons, [the officer] must be able to point
to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1967). "A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in
order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more
information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time." State
v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St. 3d 177, 180, 524 N.E.2d 489, 492 (1988) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 146 (1972)).
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ANALYSIS

A. The Stop
In determining whether, under the totality of circumstances, Officer Martin had the objective and particularized suspicion of criminal
.activity required for a stop under the fourth amendment, the Ohio Supreme Court considered three facts which arguably related to Andrews'
conduct: 2 (1) the suspect's presence in a high crime area; (2) the suspect's presence on the street after dark; and (3) the efforts by the suspect to avoid police contact. 83
1. Nature of the Area
The Ohio Supreme Court in Andrews stated that "[a]n area's rep-

utation for criminal activity is an articulable fact which is part of the
totality of circumstances surrounding a stop to investigate suspicious
behavior."' 4 Courts, however, have struggled with using the nature of
an area as a criterion upon which the officer may rely. Most courts
consider this as one factor, but it is clear that the suspect's presence in
such an area cannot "of itself ever be viewed as a sufficient basis to
make an investigatory stop.""5

82. In Andrews, the timing and existence of the seizure was not questioned. State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d 86, 562 N.E.2d 1271 (1991), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2833 (interim ed.
1991). When the officer shined the flashlight in Andrews' face and instructed Andrews to place his
hands up, it can not be disputed that a reasonable person would not feel free to walk away. Id. at
86, 565 N.E.2d at 1272. The analysis must look to the facts leading up to this moment in order to
see if the stop was justified. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see also Chesternut v. Michigan, 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
83. The Ohio Supreme Court also considered two other factors in the totality of circumstances, the officer's years of experience and the fact that he was alone, away from his cruiser.
Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 88, 565 N.E.2d at 1273-74. Neither of these factors, however, deal
with the conduct of the suspect; rather, they deal with the conduct or attributes of the officer. As
the United States Supreme Court has indicated, the focus must be on the suspect's conduct. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 (1983); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980); United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1980).
84. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 88, 565 N.E.2d at 1274 (citing United States v. Magda,
547 F.2d 756, 758 (2d Cir. 1976); State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St. 3d 177, 179, 524 N.E.2d 489, 491
(1988); State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St. 2d 291, 295, 414 N.E.2d 1044, 1047 (1980)).
85. W. LAFxvE, supra note 17, at 458 (citing Brown v. Texas, 442 U.S. 47 (1979); People
v. Aldridge, 35 Cal. 3d 473, 674 P.2d 115, 156 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1984); People v. Loewen, 35 Cal.
3d 117, 672 P.2d 436, 196 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1983); Goldsmith v. State, 405 A.2d 109 (Del. 1979);
Williams v. State, 477 N.E.2d 96 (Ind. 1985); State v. Larson, 93 Wash. 2d 638, 611 P.2d 771
(1980); State v. Stroud, 30 Wash. App. 392, 634 P.2d 316 (1981)).
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Courts allowing the use of this factor,86 including Ohio courts,8 7
have relied upon the United States Supreme Court case of United
88
States v. Brignoni-Ponce.
This reliance may be misplaced, however,
because the idea has been taken out of the context of that case. The
decision in Brignoni-Poncewas limited to the context of border patrols
searching for illegal aliens.89 Several courts which have relied upon
Brignoni-Ponce have quoted the following sentence from the decision:
"Officers may consider the characteristics of the area in which they
encounter a vehicle."" ° Citation of this isolated statement ignores both
the preceding and subsequent sentences which limit the scope of the
sentence to border patrol situations:
Any number of factors may be taken into account in deciding whether
there is reasonable suspicion to stop a car in the border area. Officers

may consider the characteristics of the area in which they encounter a
vehicle. Its proximity to the border, the usual patterns of traffic on the
particular road, and previous experience with the alien traffic are all
relevant. 91

Even in the border patrol context, the Court was hesitant to allow the
character of the area to be weighed too heavily: 92
To approve roving-patrol stops of all vehicles in the border area, without
any suspicion that a particular vehicle is carrying illegal immigrants,
would subject the residents of these and other areas to potentially unlimited interference with their use of the highways, solely at the discretion
of the Border Patrol officers."

86. United States v. White, 655 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Hall, 525
F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Magda, 547 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 878 (1977); United States v. Thomas, 551 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
87. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 88, 565 N.E.2d at 1274 (citing United States v. Magda,
547 F.2d at 758; State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St. 3d at 179,.524 N.E.2d at 491; State v. Freeman, 64
Ohio St. 2d at 295, 414 N.E.2d at 1047).
88. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
89. "Our decision in this case takes into account the special function of the Boarder Patrol.
.Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. at 883 n.8.
90. Id. at 884.
91. Id. at 884-85.
92. Id. at 882.
93. Id. In addition to Brignoni-Ponce,there have been three other cases before the United
States Supreme Court where the character of an area was used by the officer to justify a stop. In
Brown v. Texas, the Court stated that the fact that the suspect was in a high crime area, standing
alone, did not support reasonable suspicion and, therefore, the stop was illegal. 443 U.S. 47
(1978). In Adams v. Williams, the Court upheld the search and seizure of an individual in a high
crime area, at 2:15 in the morning, after the officer had received a tip from a known informant
that the person was armed and carrying drugs. The Court, however, did not explicitly address the
weight, if any, that may be given to the suspect's presence in a "high crime area," but rather
relied heavily on the tip from the informant in holding that the stop was justified. 407 U.S. 143
(1971). In the recent case of California v. Hodari D., the Supreme Court was once again
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Indeed, courts and commentators frequently criticize the use of
the high crime area as a consideration of suspicion. They view the use
of this factor as a reduction in the constitutional rights of individuals
based on where they live. 4 As the Michigan Supreme Court perceptively noted, "[a] high neighborhood crime rate requires the presence
of both innocent victims and criminal perpetration in the same neighborhood."9 Another reason many courts are hesitant to allow the use
of this factor is that it is subject to abuse. 96 One problem relates to the
evidentiary foundation necessary to determine that an area is a high
crime area. 97 Also of concern is how the activity of the suspect relates
to the area's criminal activity, and how much crime in an area is re98
quired to qualify it as a high crime neighborhood.
Most courts that have considered an area's criminal reputation as
a factor have determined it to be of limited probative value. In finding
that the seizure in Brown v. Texas99 lacked reasonable suspicion, the
United States Supreme Court noted that "the fact the [suspect] was in

presented with an opportunity to rule conclusively on the permissibility of the use of the high
crime area factor. The Court, however, declined, and decided the case exclusively on other
grounds. 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1549 n.1 (interim ed. 1991).
94. "[Plersons may not be subjected to invasions of privacy merely because they are in or
passing through a 'high crime area.'. . . A history of past criminal activity in a locality does not
justify suspension of the constitutional rights of everyone, or anyone, who may subsequently be in
that locality." People v. Aldridge, 35 Cal. 3d 473, 478-79, 674 P.2d 240, 242, 198 Cal. Rptr. 538,
540 (1984); see also Brown, 443 U.S. at 52; People v. Bower, 24 Cal. 3d 638, 597 P.2d 115, 156
Cal. Rptr. 856 (1970); People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 378 N.W.2d 451 (1980); Schwartz, Stop
& Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. CaiM. L.C. & P.S. 433, 444-52
(1967).
95. People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. at 61, 378 N.W.2d at 459; see also State v. Larson, 93
Wash. 2d 638, 645, 611 P.2d 771, 775 (1980) ("It is beyond dispute that many members of our
society live, work and spend their waking hours in high crime areas, a description that can be
applied to parts of many of our cities. That does not automatically make those individuals proper
subjects of criminal investigation."); People v. Bower, 24 Cal. 3d 638, 645, 597 P.2d 115, 119, 156
Cal. Rptr. 856, 860 (1970) ("Many of citizens of this state are forced to live in areas that have
'high crime' rates or they come to these areas to shop, work, play, transact business, or visit
relatives or friends. The spectrum of legitimate human behavior occurs every day in so-called high
crime areas."); Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 316 (D.C. 1989). "It is necessary to remind
again that thousands of citizens live and go about their legitimate day-to-day activities in area's
which surface ... in court testimony, as being high crime neighborhoods." Id. (quoting United
States v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 414, 419 n.3 (D.C. 1986) (Mack, J., dissenting)).
96. Bower, 156 Cal. 3d at 645, 597 P.2d at 119, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 860; see also Schwartz,
supra note 95, at 444-52 (1967). Police have often utilized street encounters for improper purposes, such as the wholesale harassment of minority groups and blacks in particular. Id.
97. For example, courts are often told, in conclusive terms, that an area has a high crime
rate without being told of the basis for that conclusion or the types of crime that are prevalent in
that area. Bower, 24 Cal. 3d at 648 n.8, 597 P.2d at 120 n.8, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 860 n.8. A
foundation objection was raised by Andrews' attorney at the trial court level in regards to this
factor, but the issue was not brought up on appeal. See supra Motion, note 12, at 5.
98. Bower, 24 Cal. 3d at 648 n.8, 597 P.2d at 120 n.8, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 860 n.8.
99. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
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a neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis

for concluding that [the suspect] was engaged in criminal conduct." 100
The mere presence of an individual in a high crime area does nothing
to distinguish that person from any other pedestrian in that area, and,
therefore, provides no particular reasonable basis as to the activity of
the defendant. 10 1
The California Supreme Court has been especially hesitant to use
this factor, stating that "[t]he high crime area factor is not an activity
of an individual . . . . As a result this court has appraised this factor
with caution and has been reluctant to conclude that a location's crime

rate transforms otherwise innocent-appearing circumstances into circumstances justifying the seizure of an individual."' 0 2
One recent United States Supreme Court case may lend support to
the use of the high crime area as one factor in justifying the stop of a
suspect. 0 1 In United States v. Sokolow, the Court upheld a Terry-type
stop based in part upon a "drug courier profile."'' " Among the facts
relied upon from the profile was that the suspect was arriving from a
trip to a "source city" for drugs. 0 5 By analogy, if it is permissible to
use a person's arrival from a particular city as indicating possible criminal activity, it may also be permissible to use an individual's presence
in a certain part of a city.
Nonetheless, because this factor is so ambiguous, it may not be
considered an activity of the suspect, and because it lacks the required
particularized suspicion, courts have generally held that it cannot,
"without a great deal more," support reasonable suspicion. 10 6 The Dis100. Id. at 52. "[T]he record suggests an understandable desire to assert a police presence;
however, that purpose does not negate Fourth Amendment guarantees." Id.; see also People v.
Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 60, 378 N.W.2d 451, 459 (1985). "While the crime rate in a neighborhood
may be a valid consideration to be taken into account when assessing reasonable suspicion, that
alone would not establish grounds for an investigatory stop." Id. (citation omitted).
101. Shabaz, 424 Mich. at 60, 378 N.W.2d at 459.
102. Bower, 24 Cal. 3d at 645, 597 P.2d at 119, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 860. In the past, the
Ohio Supreme Court has looked to California opinions for guidance on search and seizure matters. E.g., State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St. 2d 204, 373 N.E.2d 1253 (1978).
103. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
104. Id. at 10. A "drug courier profile" is a list of factors used by drug enforcement agents
to detect characteristics found to be common in those transporting drugs. Reid v. Georgia, 448
U.S. 438, 440 (1979).
105. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9. The Court did say, however, that this fact, "standing alone, is
not cause for any sort of suspicion." Id.
106. It was stated that:
The fact that the activity occurred in a high drug trafficking area has, in some of our cases,
been taken into account in determining the reasonableness of the officer's suspicion. ...
However, we have been careful to emphasize that this familiar talismanic litany, without a
great deal more, cannot support an inference that appellant was engaged in criminal
conduct.
Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 316 (D.C. 1989) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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trict of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded that "[t]he fact that
events . . . took place at or near an allegedly high narcotics activity
area does not objectively lend any sinister connotation to facts that are
10 7
innocent on their face.
Otherwise innocent behavior does not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion required by the fourth amendment merely because it is
occurring in a high crime area."0 ' A clearer and more articulable circumstance is required to raise reasonable suspicion. Therefore, the
Ohio Supreme Court's heavy reliance on this factor in Andrews is
misplaced.
2.

Time of Day

The time of day at which a suspect is observed may properly be
considered to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists.'
The
emphasis in this factor is not whether it is after dark, but whether it is
a time when people are typically out and about on the streets." 0
In People v. Bower,"' the California Supreme Court stated that
"[n]o reasonable suggestion of criminality is added by the fact that it

"An area's reputation can only be considered when other less ambiguous facts are present which
would lead one to suspect criminal activity is afoot." United States v. Magda, 547 F.2d 756, 764
(2d Cir. 1976) (Motley, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622, 624 (8th
Cir. 1971)). Likewise, in Sokolow, the United States Supreme Court stated that a trip to Miami,
a source city for drugs, standing alone, was not cause for any sort of suspicion. 490 U.S. at 9; see
also State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St. 3d 177, 182, 524 N.E.2d 489, 494 (1988) (Wright, J., dissenting)
(fact that car was in well-known drug selling neighborhood could not be "sole reason" for stop).
107. Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d at 316. In Smith, the articulable facts were: (1)
suspect was in a high crime area; (2) suspect departed rapidly as police approached; (3) suspect
was seen talking with known drug dealers; and (4) officers were experts on identifying "drug
teams." Id. at 314. The court found these facts insufficient to create reasonable suspicion. Id. at
317.
108. "Innocent activities do not become sinister by the mere fact that they take place in one
of these [high crime] areas." In re D.J., 532 A.2d 138, 143 (D.C. 1987) (citing Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47 (1979)). Likewise, the Montgomery County Ohio Court of Appeals stated: "The
Fourth Amendment has no less application to Roland Circle than it does to the City of Oakwood.
Pursuit of more aggressive tactics in one place than the other cannot justify different standards for
search and seizure." State v. Andrews, No. 11477, at *16 (Montgomery County Ct. App., Nov.
16, 1989) (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file). Oakwood is the most exclusive residential area in
Dayton, Ohio.
109. W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 454. "The widely held attitude of patrol officers is that
persons found on the streets late at night are more likely to be guilty of some criminal offense;
'decent' people are in bed, and those remaining on the streets without clear indications of legitimate business are 'up to no good.'" L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF
CRIME, 21 (1967).
110. "On the one hand those [appellate opinions] finding the circumstances not sufficiently
suspicious often note that the 'hour was a reasonable hour for individuals to be abroad in the
streets.'" W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 455; e.g., State v. Colley, 229 N.W.2d 755 (Iowa 1975)
(9:30 p.m., reasonable hour); Kenion v. United States, 302 A.2d 723 (D.C. 1973)(3:30 p.m., reasonable hour).
111. People v. Bower, 24 Cal. 3d 638, 597 P.2d 115, 156 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1979).
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was dark when the officer observed [the suspect]. Strictly speaking the

'night time' factor is not 'activity by a citizen, and this court has

warned that this factor should be appraised with caution.' "112 In
Bower, the court found that being out at 8:37 p.m., "while falling during darkness in winter, is simply not a late or unusual hour nor one
from which any inference of criminality may be drawn. . . . An individual in public at such times does not reasonably suggest crime is

afoot."'
Most of the cases where the time of day has been found to contribute to reasonable suspicion involve suspects who are observed on the
streets near midnight, and typically much later." 4 Once again, this factor alone will not be enough to justify a stop." 5
Although it was after dark, Officer Martin observed Andrews at
8:35 p.m., which would not be an unreasonable time for a person to be
out in a residential neighborhood."' Additionally, the facts of the case
suggest that there were other individuals in the area.1 7 Because the
time of day was not an unusual or uncommon hour for a person to be
out, this fact added little or nothing to the creation of reasonable suspicion in Andrews.
3. Efforts to Avoid Police Contact
A suspect's flight at the sight of the police may be considered a
factor in the totality of circumstances creating suspicion." 8 Flight

112. Id. at 645, 597 P.2d at 119, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
113. Id. (citations omitted); see also People v. Lathan, 38 Cal. App. 3d 911, 915, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 648, 650 (1974) ("10:15 p.m. is hardly a late or unusual hour.").
114. State v. Donnell, 239 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1976) (2:00 a.m.); State v. Taylor, 363 So.
2d 699 (La. 1978) (1:15 a.m.); State v. Purnell, 621 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. 1981) (2:00 a.m.); State v.
Stark, 502 S.W.2d 261 (Mo. 1973) (1:00 a.m.); State v. Oxley, 127 N.H. 407, 503 A.2d 756
(1985) (2:30 a.m.); State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St. 3d 177, 425 N.E.2d 489 (1988) (11:20 p.m), State
v. Freeman, 63 Ohio St. 2d 291, 414 N.E.2d 1044 (1980) (3:00 a.m.); Commonwealth v. Wascorn, 236 Pa. Super. 157, 344 A.2d 620 (1975) (12:30 a.m.); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 233 Pa.
Super. 160, 355 A.2d 512 (1975) (2:00 a.m.).
115. W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 454-56 n.1 8 7 .
116. State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d 86, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2833 (1991). The sunset on the day of the encounter was at 6:55 p.m., slightly over an hour and a
half before Andrews was first observed. DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Oct. 18, 1988, at A-8.
117. The facts of the case stated that Officer Martin's partner was in the process of questioning another individual in the area. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 86, 565 N.E. at 1272.
118. "It is not to be doubted that [flight] may be taken into account by the police and that
together with other suspicious circumstances these reactions may justify a stopping for investigation." W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 448; see, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)
("[D]eliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong
indicia of mens rea."); United States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1985) (suspect was known
by police as a burglar, seen at rear of apartment building, began running at sight of officers);
United States v. Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1980) (two men with extensive criminal
records seen darting between buildings, suspects ran away when officers approached); see also
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alone, however, is not enough to create reasonable suspicion, and may
just indicate a legitimate desire to avoid contact with the police. 119
Behavior which indicates only that an individual wants to avoid
the police' 2 0 cannot give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he is or was
engaged in criminal activity. 2 ' Citizens are under no legal duty to talk
with the police, 22 and a refusal to talk with them may be expressed
orally or by physical departure. 2 8 An individual's act of leaving the
scene hastily may be inspired by any number of reasons other than
guilt, 12 4 including "innocent fear, or by a legitimate desire not to have

State v. Jackson, 741 F.2d 223 (8th Cir. 1984); Luker v. State, 358 So. 2d 504 (Ala. Crim. App.
1978); State v. Bell, 382 So. 2d 119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Belton, 441 So. 2d 1195
(La. 1983); People v. Carter, 96 Mich. App. 694, 293 N.W.2d 681 (1980); Commonwealth v.
Moore, 300 Pa. Super. 488, 446 A.2d 960 (1980).
119. McClain v. State, 408 So. 2d 721 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Kearse v. State, 384 So.
2d 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); People v. Thomas, 660 P.2d 1272 (Colo. 1983); Jefferys v.
United States, 312 A.2d 308 (D.C. 1973); State v. Master, 127 Ariz. 210, 619 P.2d 482 (1980).
But see State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1989).
Because we conclude that flight from the police is a strong indication of 'mens rea,' i.e. a
guilty mind or a guilty purpose, we conclude that behavior which evinces in the mind of a
reasonable police officer an intent to flee from the police is suspicious behavior sufficient to
justify a temporary investigative stop.
Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d at 79, 454 N.W.2d at 764.
120. Citizens of Dayton may have added reason to avoid contact with the Dayton police
department. The city's police force has a reputation for its brutal treatment of individuals suspected of criminal activity. Bray, Scrutinized Newby Defends Moves, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,January 27, 1991, at 1-B, col. 2. In one incident, two Dayton police officers held a suspect down while
a third officer applied a hot clothes. iron to the suspect's stomach and chest in order to extract
information. Id. at 3-B. In another incident, a Dayton police officer was convicted of repeatedly
slamming the head of a man into the floor of a courthouse hallway while the man was handcuffed
and held down by four other officers. Hill, Officer Gets Split Verdict, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
March 28, 1991, at 3-A, col. 1.
121. McClain v. State, 408 So. 2d 721, 722 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (suspects ducked
into store when they saw police coming and later left, "briskly walking away").
122. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in the case of In re D.J., found that an
adverse inference cannot be drawn from a simple desire not to talk with police. 532 A.2d 138, 141
(D.C. 1987) (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)).
The person approached [by an officer], however, need not answer any question put to him;
indeed he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way . . . . He
may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so;
and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds.
Id. at 141-42 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983)).
123. "A refusal to listen or answer may take verbal form, or, it may ... take the form of
physical departure." Id. at 142. In the case of In re D.J., the encounter was on a rainy night, the
suspect made eye contact with the police, put his hands in his pocket, turned, walked quickly
away, and repeatedly changed direction to avoid the police. Id. at 139. The court held that this
was insufficient to justify the stop. Id.
124. "[T]here are many reasons other than guilt why an [individual] may not wish himself
or others present exposed to the immediate view of a stranger, even if the stranger is a police
officer." People v. Bower, 24 Cal. 3d 638, 648, 597 P.2d 115, 121, 156 Cal. Rptr. 856, 862 (1979)
(quoting Tompkins v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 2d 65, 68, 378 P.2d 113, 115, 27 Cal. Rptr. 889,
991 (1963)).
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contact with the police." 12 5 These efforts, without more, cannot justify
a detention. 12 6 An individual's desire to avoid contact with the police is

not a reasonable indicator
of suspicion without other facts to make the
27

action less ambiguous.
Often, the degree of effort expended in attempting to avoid police
contact makes a difference in how suspicious the activity is. 12 ' The suspect's effort to avoid police contact "must be such as permits a rational
conclusion that flight indicated a consciousness of guilt." 2 9 The difficulty with this, however, is the risk of mistake in interpreting an individual's actions. 3 ° "[TIhe observer may view that context quite otherwise from the actor: not only is his vantage point different, he may even
have approached the scene with a preconceived notion - consciously or
subconsciously - of what gestures he expected to see and what he expected them to mean.""' ' An inchoate and unparticularized hunch or
suspicion of evasive conduct based on some action by an individual is

not sufficient.13 2

125. Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 316 (D.C. 1989). A person is as free to avoid
police officers as to avoid any other person. Bower, 24 Cal. 3d at 648, 597 P.2d at 121, 156 Cal.
Rptr. at 862.
126. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983).
127. "[Fjlight is not 'a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances to make its
import less ambiguous.' " In re D.J., 532 A.2d at 141 (quoting Hinton v. United States, 424 F.2d
876, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). Flight alone is inherently ambiguous. People v. Shabai, 424 Mich. 42,
62, 478 N.W.2d 451, 460 (1985).
128. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 741 F.2d 223 (8th Cir. 1984) (suspect ran through yards,
jumping over fences at two in the morning); State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 454 N.W.2d 763
(1990) (suspect's car sped away at velocity that exceeded the speed limit); State v. Johnson, 444
N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1989) (suspect pulled off highway, then off secondary road, turned into driveway, shut off his lights, and pulled back onto highway a minute later).
129. Smith, 558 A.2d at 316 (quoting In re D.J., 532 A.2d at 41).
130. The California Supreme Court stated that:
The difficulty is that from the viewpoint of the observer, an innocent gesture can often be
mistaken for a guilty movement. He must not only perceive the gesture accurately, he must
also interpret it in accordance with the actor's true intent. But if words are not infrequently
ambiguous, gestures are even more so.
People v. Bower, 24 Cal. 3d 638, 647, 597 P.2d 115, 120, 156 Cal. Rptr. 856, 862 (1979) (quoting
People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 818, 478 P.2d 449, 455, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729, 735 (1970)).
131. Id. at 121.
132. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980).
The agent's belief that the [suspect] and his companion were attempting to conceal the fact
that they were traveling together, a belief that was more an 'inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or hunch,' than a fair inference in the light of his experience, is simply too slender a reed to support the seizure in this case.
Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 27); see also McClain v. State, 408 So. 2d 721, 721 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (officer's statements that the suspects "gave [him] the impression they were
trying to avoid [him]" when they ducked into a store at the sight of the police and later briskly
walked out, found to be insufficient); People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 61, 378 N.W.2d 451, 460
(1985). "Because the police could only guess about what defendant was seeking to hide, their
speculation did not provide a particularized suspicion of possessory wrongdoing, but only a generaPublished
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In Andrews, Officer Martin stated that he thought "possibly" An-

drews was running from the police.331 The Ohio Supreme Court, in an-

alyzing the facts, said it must review the circumstances through Officer
Martin's eyes."" The court, however, failed to apply the required objective standard to those facts.13 5 Specifically, was Martin's belief reasonable in light of the fact that he had received no reports of a man

running from the other cruiser?"3 6
Where it is unclear whether the suspect was fleeing from the police, or where it is unclear whether the suspect knew that it was the
police from whom he was fleeing, courts have generally found flight
insufficient for a stop.13s It must be clear that the suspect "knew that
the police were present and reacted by immediately running from the
scene of the alleged crime."' 38
In Andrews, it was unclear whether the defendant was, in fact,
running from the police or running for some other purpose.' 9 Officer
Martin admitted that, for all he knew, the suspect could have been out
jogging.140 The record only indicated that there were police "in the vicinity" at the time Andrews was observed."'
Because flight as a lone factor is so ambiguous, courts require the
presence of additional circumstances to justify a stop. 4 This is espe-

133. See supra Motion, note 12, at 18.
134. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d 86, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991), cert. denied, 11I S. Ct. 2833
(interim ed. 1991).
135. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
136. State v. Andrews, No. 11477, at *8(Montgomery County Ct. App., Nov. 16, 1989)
(LEXIS, Ohio library, App file).
137. W. LAFAvE, supra note 17 at 448; United States v. Jones, 619 F.2d 494 (5th Cir.
1980) (flight of the suspect at the sight of two strange men, in an unmarked car, was a natural
reaction); People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 378 N.W.2d 451 (1985) (suspect fleeing from unmarked police cruiser too "ambiguous"); People v. Towers, 49 A.D.2d 839, 373 N.Y.S.2d 593
(1975) (suspect began rapidly walking away at sight of unidentified strangers).
138. Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 316-17 (D.C. 1989). "However some actions
which may fairly be said to be in response to an awareness that police are in the vicinity are not of
that type [grounds for suspicion] and may be out of a desire to avoid some minor misstep .
W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 450.
139. State v. Andrews, No. 11477, at *9 (Montgomery County Ct. App., Nov. 16, 1989)
(LEXIS, Ohio library, App file).
140. Id.
141. Id. Interestingly the editor's headnotes to the Andrews' opinion are misleading because they seem to imply conclusively that Andrews was running from the police. Andrews, 57
Ohio St. 3d at 86, 565 N.E.2d at 1272.
142. "[Fjlight alone is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances to make
its import less ambiguous." People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 62, 378 N.W.2d 451, 460 (1985).
"[C]ircumstances of the suspect's efforts to avoid the police must be such as permit[] a rational
conclusion that flight indicated a consciousness of guilt and the evasive action must be accompanied by other factors warranting an intrusion ...... In re D.J., 532 A.2d 138 (D.C. 1987)
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). "While in isolation such activity is not sufficient for an
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cially true when the suspect's flight is not from the site of a known
crime. 4 3 As the Michigan Supreme Court stated: "[H]eightened general suspicion occasioned by the flight of a surveillance subject does not
alone supply the particularized, reasoned, articulable basis to conclude
that criminal activity was afoot that is required to justify the temporary seizure approved in Terry."' 44
Because conduct which a police officer could perceive as flight is so
inherently ambiguous, courts require the presence of other less ambiguous factors in order to find reasonable suspicion. 4 5 This is especially
important when it is not even clear that the suspect is running from the
police. 4" This approach has been followed by the Ohio courts. 47 In
Andrews, however, this was not the case. The other two factors relating
to the Andrews' conduct, namely the high crime area and the time of
day, were themselves also ambiguous and unparticularized." 4
4.

Totality

The majority in Andrews conceded that none of the facts discussed
above individually justified reasonable suspicion on the part of Officer

arrest, when coupled with other inculpatory circumstances, such information is relevant to a finding of probable cause." Commonwealth v. Ellis, 233 Pa. Super. 169, 173, 335 A.2d 512, 514
(1975). "[Wlhere furtive movement has been made by the occupants of a vehicle in response to
the approach of police officers, the addition of other factors may give rise to a finding of probable
cause to search the vehicle." State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St. 2d 204, 208, 373 N.E.2d 1252, 1256
(1978).
143. One court has stated that:
Flight alone does not justify an arrest, particularly when, as here, [the suspect's] running is
not flight from the scene of a reported crime. The police must positively relate the flight to
commission of a crime . . . .The officers were not investigating a particular crime; they
were not aware of any crime which had just been committed from which [the suspect]
could have been fleeing.
People v. Tebedo, 81 Mich. App. 529, 539-40, 265 N.W.2d 406, 468 (1978).
144. Shabaz, 424 Mich. at 63, 378 N.W.2d at 460.
145. Id. at 62, 378 N.W.2d at 460; In re D.J., 532 A.2d 138 (D.C. 1987); Commonwealth
v. Ellis, 233 Pa. Super. 169, 173, 335 A.2d 512 (1975).
146. United States v. Jones, 619 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1980); Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 378
N.W.2d 451 (1985); People v. Towers, 49 A.D.2d 839, 373 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1975).
147. In State v. Bobo, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that "[a] mere furtive gesture, standing alone, does not create probable cause to stop and search a vehicle without a warrant." 27 Ohio
St. 3d at 181, 524 N.E.2d at 492. Although Bobo was used by the court in other parts of the
Andrews opinion, the court did not use this, and in fact cited to nothing when discussing Andrews'
flight. See also State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St..2d 204, 373 N.E.2d 1252 (1978). In Kessler, the
Ohio Supreme Court found that where the suspect ducked down at the sight of the police car
approaching, his car matched one described in association with robberies in the area, the driver
had been previously arrested for burglaries, and the driver ran a red light, police had probable
cause to search the vehicle. Id. The court stated: "[flurtive movements alone are not sufficient to
justify the search of an automobile without a warrant." Id. at 207, 373 N.E.2d at 1256.
148. 'For a discussion of the high crime area as a factor, see supra notes 84-101, and for a
discussion of the time of day as a factor, see supra notes 84-108.
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Martin. 9 In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, however,
it is important that the facts be considered collectively.1' 5 Even innocent acts, when considered together, may be so suspicious as to justify
an investigatory stop.15 1 The United States Supreme Court stated in
62
Terry v. OhioM
that the analysis must look at the "facts, which taken
together with rational inferences from these facts, reasonably warrant
that intrusion." 16 3 The facts and circumstances with which the officer
was presented should not be dissected and viewed individually, but
must be viewed as a whole. 1 "
Whether reasonable suspicion existed can only be determined by
evaluating the totality of facts and "whether collectively [the facts] are
greater than the sum of their parts . . .,55 The inquiry is whether
the individual facts build to form the requisite objective basis for the
particularized suspicion required to justify a Terry-stop.1 5 The United
States Supreme Court has been hesitant to allow facts, innocent in
themselves, to be combined too quickly to create the required degree of
reasonable suspicion. 6 In Reid v. Georgia,1 58 the Court analyzed the
use of drug courier profiles to establish reasonable suspicion from otherwise innocent facts.16 9 In Reid, the suspect: (1) arrived from Ft. Lauderdale, a target city for drug distribution; (2) arrived early in the
morning; (3) had no luggage other then a shoulder carry on; and (4)
engaged in conduct which the drug enforcement agents interpreted as
an attempt to conceal that he was traveling with someone else.160 The
Court concluded as a matter of law that the agents could not have had
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity from what they had observed. 1 6' The Court stated that although in certain circumstances

149. "This case cannot be resolved on the basis of any one of the factors we have enumerated." State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d 86, 88, 565 N.E.2d 1271, 1274 (1991), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 2833 (interim ed. 1991).
150. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). See generally supra notes 67-70
and accompanying text.
151. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983);
Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
152. 392 U.S. 1 (1968)..
153. Id. at 21.
154. United States v. Magda, 547 F.2d 756, 758 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878
(1977); State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St. 2d 291, 414 N.E.2d 1044, 1047 (1980).
155. People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 60, 378 N.W.2d 451, 459 (1985).
156. Id. at 64, 378 N.W.2d at 460. For an example of skillful police work in adding the
facts together to establish reasonable suspicion of smuggling of illegal aliens, see United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 413-16 (1980).
157. E.g., Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1979); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1978).
158. 448 U.S. 438 (1979).
159. Id. at 440.
160. Id. at 441.
161. Id. at 441. The Court stated:
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/6
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wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal activity
162

was afoot, this was not such a case.

What makes the analysis of Andrews so problematic is the ambiguity of the factors relied upon to create reasonable suspicion. Neither
the character of the area, 16 3 nor the time of day,' nor the perceived
flight of Andrews, 65 immediately create particularized, objective

suspicion.
In Brown v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court provided
further guidance as to what facts are not sufficient to create reasonable
suspicion.' 66 In Brown, the Court found the following set of facts insufficient to create reasonable suspicion: (1) the suspect was in a high
crime area in which heavy drug activity occurred; (2) the suspect
sought to avoid police contact because the suspect and another man
began walking away from each other at the sight of the police cruiser;
and (3) the incident occurred in daylight. 67 The time of day is the only
factor different from the circumstances in Andrews, and because the
time in Andrews (8:35 p.m.) was not an unusual hour to be outdoors,' 168
the cases are actually indistinguishable. Also, as in Andrews, the officers in Brown did not claim to suspect any specific misconduct, nor
did they have any reason to believe the individual was armed. 6 9
Other jurisdictions have had occasion to address virtually the identical combination of facts as those in Andrews, and have held them to
be insufficient to create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 70 In

Of the evidence relied on, only the fact that the petitioner preceded another person and
occasionally looked backward at him as they proceeded through the concourse relates to
their particular conduct. The other circumstances describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures were the Court
to conclude that as little foundation as there was in this case could justify a seizure.
Id.
162. Id. Compare Reid, 448 U.S. 438, with United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989),
where a more unusual combination of otherwise innocent conduct was found to establish reasonable suspicion. In Sokolow, the suspect purchased $2,100 worth of plane tickets in cash to a
"source city", acted nervously, and stayed in Miami only 48 hours despite the fact that the round
trip flight took 20 hours. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 1.
163. See supra notes 84-108 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 109-117 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 118-48 and accompanying text.
166. "Although Brown does not tell us what constitutes a reasonable suspicion sufficient to
justify stopping an individual, it does indicate a set of facts that do not meet the constitutional test
for detaining an individual." State v. Larson, 93 Wash. 2d-638, 645, 611 P.2d 771, 775 (1980).
167. Brown, 443 U.S. at 48-49, 53.
168. See supra notes 109-117 and accompanying text.
169. Brown, 443 U.S. at 49.
170. People v. Aldridge, 35 Cal. 3d 473, 674 P.2d 240, 198 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1984); People v.
Bower, 24 Cal. 3d 638, 597 P.2d 115, 156 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1979); People v. Wilkins, 186 Cal.
App. 3d 804, 231 Cal Rptr. 1 (1986); In re D.J., 532 A.2d 138 (D.C. 1987); People v. Shabaz,
424 Mich. 42, 378 N.W.2d 451 (1985); State v. Larson, 93 Wash. 2d 638, 611 P.2d 771 (1980).
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State v. Larson,1 7 1 the police officer made three observations: (1) the

suspect was in a high crime area; (2) the time of day was 3:00 a.m.;
and (3) the suspect sought to avoid police contact by taking flight upon
the approach of the police. 72 Additionally, the suspect was in a car
which was illegally parked next to a closed park.113 The Washington
Supreme Court found, however, that when considered in their totality,
these circumstances failed to give rise to a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that the individual was engaged in criminal conduct.1 74 The

court found that, at best, this set of facts amounted to "nothing more
substantial than an inarticulable hunch. ' 1 75 The court concluded that
the suspect was detained "because of his presence in a particular location even though he had a legal right to be there. ''176 Another similarity is that in Larson, the court found that for all the officer knew, the
suspect could have been waiting to discharge passengers.1 77 This is similar to Andrews in that Officer Martin admitted that for all he knew,
78
Andrews could have been out jogging.'
In People v. Shabaz, 7 9 the Michigan Supreme Court found that
the officer did not have the required particularized suspicion needed for
a stop under the following facts: (1) the suspect was in a high crime

area; (2) it was nighttime; and (3) the suspect sought to avoid police
contact by running as the police approached. 8 0 The defendant also had
been seen leaving an apartment building where there was known drug

171. 93 Wash. 2d 638, 611 P.2d 771 (1980).
172. Id. at 639-40, 611 P.2d at 772.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 643, 611 P.2d at 774.
175. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22).
176. Larson, at 645, 611 P.2d at 775; see also In re D.J., 532 A.2d 138 (D.C. 1987) (court
found no reasonable suspicion where: (1) high crime area; (2) rainy night (no time given); and (3)
conduct to avoid police contact); Commonwealth v. Thibeau, 384 Mass. 762, 429 N.E.2d 1009
(1981) (the court found no reasonable suspicion where: (1) 10 p.m.; (2) sudden left turn at sight
of police; and (3) use of bikes, which the suspect was on, were known by officers to be used for
drugs deals). But see State v. Taylor, 363 So. 2d 699 (La. 1978), in which the court upheld the
stop and frisk of suspects where the stop occurred in a high crime area at 1:15 a.m. and the
suspect attempted to avoid police contact. Id. This case is distinguishable, however, in the degree
of effort the suspects expended to avoid police contact. Initially, the suspects were observed running and then stopped at the sight of a police officer. One of the two individuals then ducked out
of sight, only to reappear at the corner with his companion. The court held that this conduct was
consistent with that of someone who had just committed a crime, and was sufficient to justify a
stop under a Louisiana statute. Id. at 702-03.
177. Larson, 93 Wash. 2d at 643, 611 P.2d at 774.
178. State v. Andrews, No. 11477, at *9 (Montgomery County Ct. App., Nov. 16, 1989)
(LEXIS, Ohio library, App file). If anything, the case, for reasonable suspicion is stronger in
Larson than in Andrews, because Larson involved an unusual hour, 3:00 a.m. Larson, 93 Wash.
at 639, 611 P.2d at 772.
179. 424 Mich. 42, 378 N.W.2d 451 (1985).
180. Id. at 60, 378 N.W.2d at 459.
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activity.1 81 Additionally, the suspect started stuffing a small paper bag

under his vest after looking in the direction of the police.' 82 Even with
these additional circumstances, the court found that collectively the

factors did not form the requisite objective basis for the particularized
suspicion required for a Terry-stop.'8 '
Two California Supreme Court cases have addressed sets of circumstances similar to those presented in Andrews.' 8' In both cases, the

court found the particular combination of facts insufficient to create
the particularized reasonable suspicion required for the detention.
In People v. Bower, 8 5 the officer observed the following facts: (1)

the suspect was in a high crime area; (2) the encounter occurred during
the nighttime; and (3) the suspect sought to avoid police contact since
a group of' people, including the suspect, disbanded as police approached and the suspect exited down an alley.' 8 6 Additionally, the sus-

pect was racially out of place in the neighborhood.' 8 7 The California
Supreme Court concluded that these facts did not qualify as the "specialized knowledge" needed to convert otherwise innocent facts into
criminal ones.' 88
In People v. Aldridge,'8 9 the California Supreme Court found the

following facts insufficient to justify detention: (1) the suspect was in a
high crime area, known for its drug activity; (2) the time of day was
10:15 p.m.; and (3) the suspect sought to avoid police contact by first
walking, then running, at the sight of the police.' 90 Even though the

court conceded that the officers had extensive experience and knowledge of the area's criminal activity, that individuals in the area were
frequently armed, and that one of the officers had made more than 200
arrests in the area, including three earlier that night, the court stated

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 64, 378 N.W.2d at 461.
184. People v. Aldridge, 35 Cal. 3d 473, 674 P.2d 240, 198 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1984); People v.
Bower, 24 Cal. 3d 638, 597 P.2d 115, 156 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1979); see also People v. Wilkins, 186
Cal. App. 3d 804, 231 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1986). In the past the Ohio Supreme Court has looked to
California opinions in search and seizure cases. State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St. 3d 204, 373 N.E.2d
1252 (1978).
185. 24 Cal. 3d 638, 597 P.2d 115, 156 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1979).
186. Id. at 645, 597 P.2d at 117, 156 Cal. Rptr 858.
187. Id. at 644, 597 P.2d at 119, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 860 (suspect was a white male in a
predominately black neighborhood).
188. Id. at 646, 597 P.2d at 121, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
189. 35 Cal. 3d 473, 674 P.2d 240, 198 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1984).
190. Id. at 476, 674 P.2d at 241, 198 Cal. Rptr. 539. Like Andrews, the suspect was ultimately found to be armed. Id.
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that "[w]hether considered separately or together, these factors do not
justify the detention.
Earlier Ohio cases in which reasonable suspicion was found to exist are distinguishable from Andrews because the actual conduct of the
individuals in these earlier cases was more suspicious and more particularized.' 92 In State v. Freeman,9 ' the Ohio Supreme Court found that
there were specific articulable facts to create reasonable suspicion
where the suspect was observed sitting in a parked car at 3:00 a.m. for
over twenty minutes in a parking lot which had a history of drug activity.1 94 In State v. Bobo,'9" reasonable suspicion was found to exist
where the suspect sat in a car, disappeared from view as the police car
approached, then looked directly at the officers and bent down as if to
hide something under the seat.' 96 The officer had frequently seen the
same type of bending gesture in cars when suspects were trying to hide
197
drugs and weapons.
Another problem with Andrews is that the Ohio Supreme Court's
analysis never suggests the criminal activity of which Andrews was suspected. 98 The activities of the person being observed, when combined
with the surrounding circumstances, must affirmatively suggest some
particular criminal activity, either completed, current or intended. 9 9 In
Terry, it was clear that the suspects were casing the store for an impending "stick-up," 2 00 thus creating the "particularized and articulable
suspicion of imminent criminal activity that justified the stop and
frisk."' 20 1 Yet, the appeals court in Andrews recognized that while presence in a high crime area combined with a suspect's furtive conduct
may sometimes create reasonable suspicion, the conduct on the part of
Andrews was too ambiguous to seriously suggest that Andrews was
seeking to avoid the police or had committed a crime. 2 The appellate

191. Id. at 478, 674 P.2d at 252, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
192. State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St. 3d 177, 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988); State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio
St. 2d 291, 414 N.E.2d 1044 (1980).
193. 64 Ohio St. 2d 291, 414 N.E.2d 1044 (1980).
194. Id. Although the case was never appealed, the result in Freeman is itself questionable.
Further, as Justice Wright pointed out in his dissent in Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 90, 565
N.E.2d at 1275 (Wright, J.,dissenting), the Ohio Supreme Court was recently criticized for its
approach to the search and seizure issue and summarily reversed in Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541
(1990).
195. 37 Ohio St. 3d 177, 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988). Bobo was relied upon heavily by the court
in Andrews. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 87-88, 565 N.E.2d at 1273-74.
196. Bobo, 37 Ohio St. 3d at 177-78, 524 N.E.2d at 489.
197. Id.
198. See Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d 86, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1988).
199. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 73 (Harlan, J., concurring); People v. Shabaz, 424
Mich. 42, 63, 378 N.W.2d 451, 460 (1985).
200. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
20t. People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. at 63-64, 378 N.W.2d at 461.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/6
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this was nothing more than an "inarticulate

Subjective Standard

Perhaps the biggest problem with the Ohio Supreme Court's analysis in Andrews is the apparent use of a subjective standard in analyzing the stop. Terry and its progeny have insisted upon an objective
"reasonable police officer" standard in analyzing the facts."0 4 In Terry,
the United States Supreme Court made clear that,
[t]he scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when
it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subject to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a
judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search and
seizure in light of the particular circumstances . . . .It is imperative
that the facts be judged by an objective standard: Would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure warrant a man of reasonable caution . .. in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.
Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed
rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches .. .
simple good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough.2"5
The fourth amendment requires that the detaining officer have a reasonable suspicion based upon objective observations.2 06
Ohio courts have repeatedly upheld the objective standard requirement.20 7 In State v. Bobo,2" 8 the Ohio Supreme Court stated "it is imperative that the facts be judged by an objective standard: would the

(LEXIS, Ohio library, App file). "The degree of suspicion that attached to his acts did not warrant the stop: The officer had no information from radio calls or reports that the officers in the
police vehicle on Roland Circle were seeking Appellant." Id.
203. Id.
204. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-19. "An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective
manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity." United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1980).
205. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 47 (1978).
[A]n individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions
solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field . . . . [A] seizure must be based
on specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require the seizure
of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.
Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
206. United States v. Cortez 449 U.S., 411, 418 (1980). "[W]e have required the officers to
have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal
activity." Brown, 443 U.S. at 51.
207. State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St. 3d 177, 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988); State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio
St. 2d 291, 414 N.E.2d 1044 (1980); State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St. 2d 204, 373 N.E.2d 1252
(1978).
208. 37 Ohio St. 3d 177, 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988).
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facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search

warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken
was appropriate?

' 20 9

In State v. Freeman,21 0 the Ohio Supreme Court

stated that "[t]he mood of the precinct and the circumbient activities
are to be viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police
officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training." '' In Andrews the Ohio Supreme Court cited Freeman and United States v.
Hall,2 1 2 but altered the wording used in those opinions. In speaking of
the standard governing the court's analysis of Martin's observations,
the court stated that it must "view the circumstances through his eyes.
He was the 'reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene.' "213
Once again, the Ohio Supreme Court has taken wording out of its original context. 2 14 In this instance, it has switched the phrasing around to
mean the exact opposite of what the standard was supposed to be.
Under this wording, the objective "reasonableness standard" effectively
becomes a subjective one.
This switch to a subjective standard has an effect not only on the
view relating to "adding up" the totality of circumstances, but on the
individual factors as well. This is especially true of the flight factor in
this case. If a court looks at the situation only through the eyes of the
police officer and determines conclusively that "he is the reasonable police officer," then the conclusion as to whether Andrews was running
from the police is not made in accordance with Terry's objective standard which requires "detached" and "neutral scrutiny. '2 15 A subjective

209. Id. at 178-79, 524 N.E.2d at 491.
210. 64 Ohio St. 2d 291, 414 N.E.2d 1044 (1980).
211. Id. at 295, 414 N.E.2d at 1047 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Hall, 525
F.2d 857,859 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
212. 525 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
213. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 88, 565 N.E.2d at 1274 (emphasis added). In its entirety,
the paragraph states:
We believe that the facts support a reasonable suspicion by Martin that Andrews was
engaged in criminal activity. Martin was an experienced police officer with twelve and a
half years on the force and was familiar with the Roland Circle area. We must view the
circumstances of the stop through his eyes. He was the 'reasonable and cautious police
officer on the scene' who is guided by his own experience and training.
Id. (quoting State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St. 2d 291, 294, 414 N.E. 1044, 1047 (1980); Hall, 525
F.2d at 859).
214. While in its analysis of the high crime area factor, see supra note 91 and accompanying text, the court only took a sentence selectively out of the context of the original paragraph,
here the court has dissected the words themselves out of the original sentence.
215. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. An example of the application of this objective, detached scrutiny can be found in Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980), where the United States Supreme
Court found that an officer's belief that two individuals were attempting to conceal the fact that
they were traveling together did not adequately meet this objective standard. Id. at 441. The
Court stated that "a belief that was more of an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch,
than a fair inference in the light of his experience, is simply too slender a reed to support the
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/6
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standard essentially eliminates the detached, neutral scrutiny of the
court, and for all practical purposes, eliminates the restraints the fourth
amendment provides against potentially abusive police conduct.2 16
In summary, none of the factors upon -which the Andrews court
relied, taken either individually or as a whole, are sufficient to form the
reasonable and particularized suspicion Terry requires to justify the
seizure. Numerous courts of other states have dealt with cases involving
high crime areas, night encounters, and flight from police, and have
found the factual combination insufficient. 1 7 What is most remarkable.
in Andrews is that it is not even clear that Andrews was running from
the police, only that there were police in the vicinity. If the "avoidance
of police" factor is to be used at all, it should be used with great caution, otherwise individuals in high crime areas in which there is a high
probability of police presence will be subject to virtually random police
stops. Furthermore, a court's use of a subjective standard in analyzing
the -circumstances is clearly counter to the fundamental requirements
and purposes of the Terry decision.
B.

The Frisk

There are basically two ways in which an officer may acquire the
required reasonable suspicion that a stopped individual is armed and
presently dangerous. First, the nature of the crime which the suspect is
believed to be contemplating may lead to a police officer's reasonable
suspicion. Second, some surrounding circumstances or action on the
part of the suspect may reasonably indicate that he is armed. 18
Neither of these were established in the Andrews case.
1. The Nature of the Crime
In Terry, the United State Supreme Court indicated that an ofseizure in this case." Id. Likewise, the California Supreme Court said of this objective, detached
analysis: "Not only must (the officer] subjectively entertain such a suspicion, but it must be objectively reasonable for him to do so; the facts must be such as would cause any reasonable police
officer in a like position . . . to suspect the same criminal activity and same involvement by the
person in question." People v. Aldridge, 35 Cal. 3d 473, 478, 674 P.2d 240, 242, 198 Cal. Rptr.
538, 540 (1984) (citations omitted). The court found a subjective but not an objective belief i'n the
existence of criminal activity. Id. The court stated that "mere subjective speculation as to the
mens' purported motives . . . carries no weight." Id. at 479, 674 P.2d at 243, 198 Cal. Rptr. at
541; see supra notes 189-191 and accompanying text.
216. Cf. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. See generally note 120 and accompanying text on incidents
of police abuse in Dayton.
217. See, e.g., People v. Aldridge, 35 Cal. 3d 473, 674 P.2d 240, 198 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1984);
People v. Bower, 24 Cal. 3d 638, 597 P.2d 115, 156 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1979); People v. Wilkins, 186
Cal. App. 3d 804, 231 Cal Rptr. 1 (1986)' In re D.J., 532 A.2d .138 (D.C. 1987); People v.
Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 378 N.W.2d 451 (1985); State v. Larson, 93 Wash. 2d 638, 611 P.2d 771
(1980).
218.
W. LAFAvE, supra
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ficer was required to conduct some type of inquiry upon the suspect
before the officer could justify the frisk. 21 9 This requirement seems to
have eroded. A frisk is now immediately permissible if the facts leading
to the stop also give the officer reasonable suspicion that the suspect is
armed and dangerous. 2 °
This ability to conduct an immediate search, however, does not
justify a search of every individual stopped. The right to conduct an
immediate frisk must be based on the reasonable suspicion that the
individual "has committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
type of crime for which the offender would likely be armed. '22 1 Examples of crimes where the suspect would likely be armed include robbery, burglary, rape, assault with weapons, homicide and dealing or
possession of large quantities of drugs. 222 Where the individual is suspected of a crime that does not typically involve use of a weapon, other
circumstances are required to justify the search. 2 3 Examples of these
types of crimes include trafficking in small quantities of narcotics, possession of marijuana, illegal possession of liquor, prostitution, bookmaking, shoplifting, underage drinking, minor assault with a weapon, or
224
vagrancy.
This part of the analysis becomes problematic because in Andrews
it is never made clear exactly what Officer Martin suspected Andrews
of doing. It has been stated that this was an area of drug activity,2 25 yet
even where a small amount of narcotics is believed to be present, no
frisk is justified. 226 As the dissent in Andrews points out, it is inconceiv-

219. The United States Supreme Court, in Terry, said that a frisk was justified "where in
the course of investigating this behavior [the officer) identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety." Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. The purpose for the Terry
stop is to allow the officer to "maintain the status quo" in order to further assess the situation.
State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St. 2d 291, 296, 414 N.E.2d 1044, 1047 (1980). "A brief stop of a
suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily
while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the
officer at the time." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
220. Williams, 407 U.S. at 143 (if at the time of the stop a police officer has reasonable
suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous, he or she may immediately frisk the suspect); see also U.S. v. Wheeler, 800 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1986).
221. W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 506.
222. Id. In Terry, the officer's observation of the suspects' conduct lead him to believe the
suspects were contemplating a daylight robbery, a crime which typically involves the use of a
weapon. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28. In Terry, however, the officer, in fact, did not frisk until after
making an initial inquiry of the suspects. Id. It appears under the current analysis, that inquiry
would no longer be necessary to justify the frisk. Williams, 407 U.S. at 143.
223. W. LAFAvE, supra note 17, at 507.
224. Id.
225. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 89, 565 N.E.2d at 1273.
226. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Gibbs v. State, 18 Md. App. 230, 306 A.2d
587 (1973); State v. Duvernoy, 156 W.Va. 578, 195 S.E.2d 631 (1973).
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able, based on these facts and such a brief observation of Andrews,
that Officer Martin could have had any suspicion of criminal activity,
much less the specific suspicion of an act involving a weapon.22 7
2.

Other Circumstances or Gestures

Even where the suspect has not been stopped for suspicion of a
crime likely to involve the use of a weapon, the officer may still frisk
the suspect if the surrounding circumstances or some action on the part
of the suspect indicates that he may be armed. 2 8 Once again, however,
this is dependent on there having been reasonable suspicion to have
stopped the individual in the first place.2 29
In Andrews, the frisk came almost immediately after the stop. 2 °
The suspect's only conduct between the time he was stopped and the
time he was frisked was throwing down a can of beer.231 The court
must look to the facts which justified the stop, and determine if these
facts also justified a belief that the suspect was armed and presently
dangerous. 3 2 The Ohio Supreme Court's apparent use of a subjective
standard, as discussed previously, again runs counter to this standard. 3 In order to justify the search, the belief that the suspect is
armed and presently dangerous must be objectively reasonable. 23 4 The
officer must be "aware of specific facts which would warrant a reasonable person to believe he was in danger. ' 23 5 A mere subjective belief on
23
the part of the officer is not sufficient.
The following conduct has been found to indicate that the suspect
is armed and dangerous: a characteristic bulge in the pocket;2 37 an observation of an object in the pocket that may be a weapon,2 38 and an

227. Id. at 90, 565 N.E.2d at 1276 (Wright, J., dissenting).
228. W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 507. C.f. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972);
Ybarra v. New York, 444 U.S. 85 (1979); State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St. 3d 177, 524 N.E.2d at 489
(1988).
229. Adams, 407 U.S. at 146; Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
230. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 86, 565 N.E.2d at 1272.
231. Id.
232. "[T]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at
502. The mere fact that an individual is suspected of being armed is not sufficient to justify a
frisk. The officer must believe the suspect is armed and presently dangerous to him. Id.
233. See supra notes 204-215 and accompanying text.
234. United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1100 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Terry, 392
U.S. at 27.
235. Tharpe, 536 F.2d at 1101.
236. "The test is an objective one rather then a subjective one ....
W. LAFAVE, supra
note 17, at 504. o
237. E.g., People v. Allen, 50 Cal. App. 3d 896, 123 Cal Rptr. 80 (1975); State v. Allen, 93
Wash.2d 170, 606 P.2d 1235 (1980).
238. Commonwealth v. Wascom, 236 Pa. Super. 157, 344 A.2d 630 (1975).
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otherwise inexplicable sudden movement towards a pocket or other
place where a weapon might be. 39
In Adams v. Williams,2 40 the United States Supreme Court found
that a frisk was permissible where the officer had received a tip from a
reliable, known informant that the suspect was armed, the suspect was
sitting in his car in a high crime area at 2:15 a.m., and, when the
officer approached the suspect and asked him to step out of the car, the
suspect responded by rolling down his window.2" 1 The Court stated that
the officer had "ample reason to fear for his safety" because of this
non-responsive gesture and the officer's inability to -see the suspect's
hand movements in the car.242
In Ybarra v.. New York, 41 however, the United States Supreme
Court found that the officer did not have a reasonable belief that the
suspect was armed and presently dangerous where the officer did not
recognize the suspect as a person with a criminal history, the suspect's
hands were empty, the suspect gave no indication of possessing a
weapon, the suspect made no move or gesture that might indicate an
intent to assault the officer, and the suspect acted in a non-threatening
manner. The Court said "[t]he state is unable to articulate any specific
fact that would have justified a police officer at the scene in even suspecting that Ybarra was armed and dangerous. ' "
One fact upon which the Ohio Supreme Court relied heavily in
justifying the search in Andrews was that the officer was away from his
cruiser and alone at the time of the encounter.2 45 The Ohio Supreme
Court had used this factor previously to justify a search of a suspect in
State v. Bobo.246 In Bobo, however, there was the additional fact of the
type of gesture made by the suspect. The suspect in Bobo was seen
bending down as if to place something under the seat.24 7 The court
found that this movement warranted a belief on the part of the officer
that the suspect might have access to weapons. 248 By comparison, in
Andrews, the court never explained how the gesture of throwing down
a can of beer after a police officer startled him indicated that Andrews

239. United States v. Walker, 576 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Vincent, 395
F. Supp. 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); State v. Joao, 56 Haw. 216, 533 P.2d 270 (1975).
240. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
241. Id. at 144-45.
242. Id. at 147-48.
243. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
244. Id. at 93.
245. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 89, 565 N.E.2d at 1274.
246. 37 Ohio St. 3d 177, 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988). This opinion was relied on heavily in
Andrews.
247. Id. at 180, 524 N.E.2d at 492.
248. Id. at 179, 524 N.E.2d at 492.
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had access to a weapon.2 49 Additionally, the Ohio Supreme Court's reliance on the fact that Martin was alone and away from his cruiser at
the time of the encounter is misplaced because the focus must be on the
conduct of the suspect not on that of the officer.2 50 Justification for a
frisk cannot be established by the fact that the "officer has unnecessarily put himself in a position of danger by not avoiding the individual in
question."2" 1
A final factor to which the Ohio Supreme Court attached great
significance in justifying Officer Martin's belief that the suspect was
armed is that the encounter was in a high crime area.2 52 This factor,
however, lacks the "particularized suspicion" required by Terry.2 53 In
Maryland v. Buie,25 4 the United State Supreme Court stated that
"[e]ven in high crime areas, where the possibility that any given individual is armed is significant, Terry requires reasonable, individualized
suspicion before a frisk for weapons can be conducted. ' 255 It appears
from the Andrews decision, however, that any person stopped in a police-designated high crime area is presumed to be armed and
dangerous.2 50
The Ohio Supreme Court justified the frisk on the facts that Officer Martin accosted Andrews in a dark area away from Martin's
cruiser, Andrews threw a beer can to the ground in a sudden motion,
and Officer Martin knew the area was a high crime area.2 57 The court
appears to have ignored the second step of the Terry analysis, stating
that Martin's "suspicion that Andrews was engaged in criminal activity
also warranted a belief that Andrews might be armed and dangerous." 25' 8 As legal support for this statement, the Ohio Supreme Court
can cite only to the fact mentioned in Terry that American criminals

249.
250.

251.
252.

Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 89, 565 N.E.2d at 1274.
See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980).
W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 499.
Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 86, 565 N.E.2d at 1272.

253. The California Supreme Court stated:
To hold that police officers should in the proper discharge of their duties detain and question all persons in that location or all those who act nervous at the approach of officers
would for practical purposes involve an abrogation of the rule requiring substantial circumstances to justify the detention and questioning of persons on the street.
People.v. Aldridge, 35 Cal. 3d 473, 479, 674 P.2d 240, 243, 198 Cal. Rptr. 538, 541 (1984). In
United States v. Magda, the court said that the stop of an individual in a high crime area was
permissible where the stop was limited in scope and involved no intrusion of personal security. 547
F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1976). A stop to ask questions is permissible. Id. In Andrews, however, the
officer went directly to the frisk. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 86, 565 N.E.2d at 1274.
254. 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990)
255. Id.
256. Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 89, 565 N.E.2d at 1274.
257. Id.
Id.
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have a long history of using weapons.2" Terry and the cases following,
however, have consistently required something more to justify the
frisk. " ' The officer must not only suspect that the individual was involved in criminal activity, but also that the individual is armed and
presently dangerous to the officer or to others. 261 Although a weapon
was ultimately discovered by Officer Martin, "a search is not made
bad when it starts and
legal by what it turns up, in law it is good or
26 2
success.1
its
from
character
does not change
V.

CONCLUSION

State v. Andrews represents a further reduction of the protection
of the fourth amendment. This is especially true for those citizens who
must live or work in areas of high crime. Any person seen running
through a high crime area at night when a police cruiser is in the area,
which in such an area is probably quite often, is not only reasonably
suspected of criminal activity, but may, upon those facts, be considered
armed and potentially dangerous.
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision to legitimize the stop and frisk
of Christopher Andrews based upon these facts has the effect of
strengthening the weight each of those factors carries within the analysis. The use of the high crime area factor is especially bolstered by this
decision because so little is now required in addition to that fact to
justify a seizure and search of a citizen. 6 ' When this lowered standard
is combined with the court's apparent use of a subjective standard in
analyzing the individual facts and the totality of circumstances, the
fourth amendment's protections become meaningless. The United
States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari to Andrews further erodes
these protections since the case will now serve as unchallenged
precedent.2 64
Only When the objective scrutiny of the courts checks the conduct
of officers in the field can the protections of privacy and personal security, ensured by the fourth amendment, be realized. By narrowly defining the scope of these protections, the Ohio Supreme Court increased
the opportunity for abuse of those rights by those acting under color of

259. Terry, 392 U.S. at 23.
260. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972); Terry, 392 U.S. at 24 (1968).
261. Id.
262. United States v. Di Re 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
263. The only two other factors required in Andrews are the appearance of flight and the
time of day. See supra notes 137-148, 109-117 and accompanying text.
264. The United States Supreme Court's decision not to review Andrews is another example
of the Court's recent trend in contracting the coverage of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (interim ed. 1991); Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382
(interim ed. 1991); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
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law. In the words of Justice Wright, "[i]f. . .those circumstances are
to become the bases for analyzing the reasonableness of future
searches, of what value is the Fourth Amendment? Little, I think. '265
Brian J. O'Connell

265.

Andrews, 57 Ohio St. 3d at 91, 565 N.E.2d at 1276 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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